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[B. 11'. No. 17257. In Bank. Mar. 14, 1941.] 
THE VON HAMM-YOUNG COMPANY, LTD. (a Corpo-
ration), Respondent, T. CITY AND COUNTY OF 
SAN FRANCISCO. Appellant. 
[1] Oommerce-'laxation.-Neither the fact that goods stored in 
warehouses have moved in interstate commerce nor the faet 
that further movement is intended is, alone, a bar to taxation 
by the state. 
[I] Id.-Taxation.-The fact that a shipper could have diverted 
goods from their destination does not remove them from the 
protection of the commerce clanse (U. B. Const., art. I, 18) 
where other facts show that interstate transit had already be-
gun and the interruption of this transit was only incidental 
to its continuation. 
Kelt. Dfc. Beference: [1-8] Commeree, 18. 
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[3] Id.-'I'uation.-Where a break in the interstate transit of 
goods is merely incident to the interstate journey of goods, 
the property remains immune from local taxation. 
[4] Id.-'1'uation.-Goods brought into the state and held in 
storage for shipment to Hawaii were immune from lot"al 
taxation where the storage was incidental to the transit of the 
goods through the state and where the delay, although for 
an indefinite period, aroee entirely from the lack of facilities 
for immediate transportation. 
[6] Id. - '1'u:ation. - Neither goods purchased in California at 
points other than San Francisco which had been delivered to 
common earriers for shipment to Hawaii and had begun their 
interstate journey, but were diverted to San Francisco ware-
houses because of the shortage of shipping space, Dor goods 
which were purchased in San Francisco and delivered to the 
warehouses because the wartime emergency regulations pr0-
hibited immediate delivery to the carriers, but whieb were 
eertainly committed to movement out of the state in view of 
the fact that shipping permits had been obtained, 'Were Dot 
subject to loeaItaxation on the ground that the interstat& 
journey had Dot begun. 
[I] Id.-'1'uation.-lntoxicating liquor purchased for shipment 
to Hawaii, but temporarily stored in San Francisco 'W&re-
houses because of the shortage of shipping space, is Dot sub-
ject to local taxation on the ground that under U. S. Const., 
Amend. 21, the state may regulate interstate tramc in a1co-
holie beverages, since such amendment has DO application to 
the transportation of liqnor through a state. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court· of 
the City and County of San Francisco. Franklin A. Grif-
fin, Judge, A1Ilrm.ed. 
Action to recover taxes paid under protest. Judgment 
for plainti1f aftlrmed. 
Bobert W. Kenny, Fred N. Howser, Attomeys General, 
John L. Nourse, James E. Sabine, Deputy Attomeys General, 
John J. O'Toole, City Attomey, and Walter A. Dold, Chief 
'Deputy City Attomey, for Appellant. 
Brobeck, Phleger " Harrison and Bobert B. Walker for 
Respondent. 
[8] When interstate transportation precluding state taxation 





TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment re-
covered by plainti1l for the refund of personal property 
taxes levied on ita property warehoused in San Francisco 
on the first Monday in March, 1943. 
Plainti1l is an Hawaiian corporation engaged in wholesale 
and retail merchandising in Hawaii. It purchases merchan· 
dise from manufacturers and dealers in various parts of the 
United States for resale in Hawaii. The corporation is not 
quali1led to do business in California and has never sold any 
of ita merchandise within this state. Before the outbreak of 
the war with Japan, goods purchased by plaintiff in the vari-
ous states were shipped directly to Hawaii, via the Panama 
Canal, or transported by rail to West Coast ports and trans-
shipped to Hawaii. Normally such goods on passing through 
San Francisco were transferred directly from freight cars to 
vessels or to the wharves and thence to vessels. Upon the out-
break of war, all shipping to the Hawaiian Islands was halted. 
Shipping was resumed in March of 1942, under the control 
of the War Shipping Administration, which operated all 
American Cargo vessels. Commercial shipping to the Islands ! 
through the Panama Canal was not resumed, and all good!: 
destined for Hawaii had to be transshipped through West 
Coast ports. 
From the time of the reswnption of shipping until after 
the taxes in question were assessed, there was a continuous 
shortage of vessels for the transportation of merchandise 
'to Hawaii. The War Shipping Administration, in eoopera-
ttion with the government of Hawaii, set up a system of , 
·ebipping permits and allotment of cargo space for ship- I 
menta from West Coast ports to the Islands. \ 
.An importer of goods into Hawaii was required to obtain 
a permit from an agency of the Hawaiian government before 
purchasing good~ for shipment. These permits were issued 
011 a priority basis, which entitled the importer to cargo space I 
'when it became available but did not assure him that such 
·space would be available. The importer also had to obtain an 
allotment of cargo space from the representative of the War 
Shipping Administration in San Francisco. Allotments were 
issued under the direction of a representative of the military 
governor of Hawaii, and, after control was returned to the 
civil governor, under the direction of the civil governor's I 
representative. Cargo space was first allotted to food; space 
I that remained was apportioned to other merchandise. 
) 
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Plaintiff's merchandise consisted of goods other than foods, 
and during this period there was continuously more of 
such cargo than could be taken by the available ships. All 
of plaintiff's goods in San Francisco on tax day were pur-
chased after shipping permits had been obtained. Approxi-
mately 89 per cent of the cost value of this merchandise 
was purchased from sellers outside of California, about 1 
per cent from sellers at points in California other than 
San Francisco, and about 10 per cent from sellers in San 
Francisco. The trial court found that, 
.. All of said goods [in the San Francisco warehouses] (ex· 
cept those purchased in San Francisco) had been shipped b) 
rail to San Francisco prior to the first Monday in March, 
1943, en route to the Territory; they were all consigned b~' 
the shippers to plaintiff at Honolulu, Hawaii. Upon arrival 01 
the goods in San Francisco the railroad notified plaintiff 01. 
their arrival. Cargo space was not available for shipment ot 
the goods when they arrived in San Francisco, and plaintill 
therefore caused the goods to be delivered to San FrancisCl' 
warehouses to be held temporarily until cargo space shoul<' 
become available. (Where cargo space was available whe1\ 
goods arrived in San Francisco, they were immediate1) 
loaded on vessels and shipped to the Territory.) 
.. All of such goods were removed from the warehouses, 
placed on board vessels, and shipped to the Territory as soon 
as cargo space was allocated for them by the San Francisco 
representative of the Military Governor of Hawaii. None 01 
such goods were processed or changed in form subsequent u 
their purchase by plaintiff and prior to their shipment from 
San Francisco to the Territory; and none of them were heM 
or detained in San Francisco for any purpose other thar. 
to await the allocation of cargo space. Plaintiff had urgen'! 
need for the goods in the Territory and had ample war&-
housing space for them there. . . ." 
A few items were in the warehouses in San Francisco for 
as short a time as 18 days, some for as long as nine months, 
but most of the goods remained in warehouses for from two 
to three months. The trial court found that the sole re8SOll 
for the storage was the shortage of shipping space and thf' 
system of controls and that the storage was not for the bene· 
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finding was not supported by the evidence and that the trial 
court erred in holding that the tax was levied on personal 
property in the course of interstate transit in violation of 
article 1, section 8, of the United States Constitution. It is 
also contended that, in any event, tb.~ property purchased 
in San Francisco had never been in interstate transit and 
was therefore subjeet to the tax. 
[1] The basic issue with respect to the taxability of the 
goods that were shipped by rail to San Francisco is whether I 
their storage in San Francisco constituted such a break in 
their interstate transit as to remove them from the protection 
of the commerce clause. Neither the fact that the goods had' 
moved in interstate commerce nor the fact that further move-
ment was intended is, alone, a bar to the tax. (Bacon v. lUi-
noil, 227 U.S. 5Of, 515 {33 S.Ct. 299, 57L.Ed. 615].} [I] On 
the other hand, the fact that the shipper could have diverted 
the goods from their destination does not remove them from the 
protection of the commerce clause, if the other facts show 
that the interstate transit had already begun and the inter-
ruption of this transit was only incidental to its continuation. 
(HugAes Bros. Tim.ber 00. v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 469, 476 
[48 S.Ct. 170, 71 L.Ed. 359].) The role governing the break ! 
in transit is stated in Minnesota v. Bl4Siw, 290 U.S. 1, 8 [54 
S.Ot. 34, 18 L.Ed. 131], as follows: " ... the States may not 
tax property in transit in interstate commerce. But, by rea-
son of a break in the transit, the property may come to rest 
within a State and become subject to the power of the State , 
to impose a nondiseriminatory property tax .... The 'crucial 
question' in determining whether the State's taxing power 
may thus be exerted, is that of 'continuity of transit.' OM-
.em Petroleum. Co. v. Vial, 279 U.S. 95, 101 [49 S.Ct. 292, 13 
L.Ed. 626] .... Formalities such as the forma of billing and 
mere changes in the method of transportation do not affect 
the continuity of the transit. The question is always one of 
substance and in any particular ease it is necessary to consider 
the particular occasion or purpose of the interruption during 
which the tax is sought to be levied." 
[8] The question therefore is what occasion or purpose 
will bring the property within the jurisdiction of the local 
taxing authority. If the break in interstate transit is merely 
incident to the interstate journey, such as a breakdown in' 
the transportation syst.em (Cha'l1t1)7(!in ReaUy Co. v. Brattle-
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to promote the safe or convenient transit of the property 
(Champlain Realty Co. v. Brattleboro, S'Upraj Kelley v. 
Rhoads, 188 U.S. 1 [23 S.Ot. 259, 47 L.Ed. 359]), to await 
ships, or to permit accumulation of sufficicnt cargo to load a 
ship (Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vial, 279 U.S. 95 [49 S.Ot. 292, 
73 L.Ed. 626]), the property rcmains immune from local tax-
ation. A property tax may be imposed on the cargo, how-
ever, if the interruption is "not in necessary delay or accom-
modation to the means of transportation ... but for the busi-
ness purposes and profit of the [taxpayer]" (General Ot1 Co. 
v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 230-231 [28 S.Ot. 475, 52 L.Ed. 754] ; 
Susquehanna Coal Co. v. South Amboy, 228 U.S. 665, 668 
[33 S.Ot. 712, 57 L.Ed. 1015]), such as a halt to process the 
goods (Bacon v. nUnois, 227 U.S. 504 f33 S.Ot. 299, 57 L.Ed. 
615] ; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Schnipper, 56 F.2d 30), to 
accumulate a stock of goods to enable the owner to fill orders 
more readily (Susquehanna Coal Co. v. South Amboy, S'Upra) , 
to separate the goods for distribution to customers, to place the 
goods in di1ierent containers (General Ot1 Co. v. Crain, supra) 
or to hold the goods for sale. (Minnesota v. Blasiu..~, 290 U.S. 
1 [54 S.Ot. 34, 78 L.Ed. 131] ; American Steel &- Wire Co. v. 
Speed, 192 U.S. 500 [24 S.Ot. 365, 48 L.Ed. 538] ; Brown v. 
Houston, 114 U.S. 622 [5 S.Ot. 1091, 29 L.Ed. 257].) 
[4] Defendant contends that the storage in San Francisco 
served the business purposes of plaintiff by enabling it to 
purchase merchandise as it became available. Defendant re-
lies on the following uncontradicted testimony of plaintiff's 
district manager of its San Francisco office: "Q. Was there 
any reason for doing that [warehousing the goods] other than 
inability to secure shipping space' A. Yes. A lot of this 
merchandise was critical merchandise; if we didn't take the 
merchandise we lost it. In other words, it went to other places. 
Most of it was bought on a priority and if we didn't take it, 
why, it would go to other customers by the suppliers. Q. Was 
there any advantage to your keeping the merchandise in ware-
houses' A. None whatsoever. . . ." The witness also ad-
mitted that the fact that cargo space was limited was known, 
but he explained the action of the company as follows: "Be-
cause you never knew when we were going to get an oppor-
tunity to ship merchandise, we would go ahead and get quite 
a bit of merchandise. Q. What do you mean' A. Matson 
fthe agent of the War Shipping Administration] might get 
an extra boat and they would call for cargo right away; if we 
') 
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didn't have it in this port, why, we wouldn't get it shipped." 
Defendant contends that it is clear from this testimony that 
if storage facilities for merchandise purchased had not been 
available, plaintiif would have had to forego its purchases, 
that plaintiff knew that the gool!s had to be stored, that by 
making San Francisco a depot for. the collection of scarce 
goods, plaintiff gained a special business advantage, and that 
because of this beneficial use of local facilities there was a 
sufficient break in the transit of goods to remove the bar 
to their taxation. 
It is immaterial, however, what goods plaintiif purchased 
or why it purchased them.. The crucial question is not why the 
goods were bought, but why they were stored in San Fran-
cisco. It cannot be seriously questioned that they were stored 
there solely because, of the inadequacy of shipping facilities, a 
condition completely beyond plaintiff's control. Plaintiff was 
engaged in business for profit, and its primarY purpose was to 
get as much goods as poBBible to Hawaii as rapidly as possible., 
The goods did not lose their exemption because plaintiff sent 
them to San Francisco knowing they would have to be 
stored there until shipping space became available. In Oham-
plain Realty 00. tI. Brattl.eboro, mpra, the taxpayer floated 
logs from Vermont to New Hampshire. The boom at the 
destination, Hinsdale, New Hampshire, was incapable of hold-
ing all the logs when the water was high and the current swift. 
Logs impounded in Brattleboro, Vermont, on tax day to await 
subsidence of high waters were held immune from taxation ~I 
during this interruption. The logs were sent on their journey :~ 
in the knowledge that they would be held at the boom in .. 
Brattleboro. .. 'In anticipation of the probable high water in' 'l 
the Connecticut, plaintiff baR previously placed its boom :j 
across West River near its mouth [Brattleboro, Vermont] to 
hold the wood there until the water in the Connecticut had 
receded enough to allow it to beheld at the mill at Hinsdale.' " ,i 
(260 U.S. 366, 368.) The taxpayer in that case not only pre- ... :~,:,' 
pared for the storage of the logs at Brattleboro before sending t 
them on their journey but it used the Brattleboro boom as a '~ 
substitute for more costly terminal facilities in New Hamp- .", 
shire, for the logs could have continued their journey without ':l 
delay had the New Hampshire boom been stronger or other ~~ . 
l' facilities provided to receive the logs. (See Powell, 0O'n-
temporary Oommerce Ol.(Juse Controversies Over State Ta:e-
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facilities at Brattleboro, the taxpayer could not have floated 
its logs at the time it chose ~ do 80, just as the plaintifr in 
the present case could not have sent its goods on to San Fran-
cisco had there been no storage facilities there. 
In the present ease, the storage in San Francisco was not 
a substitute for storage in Hawaii, for the plaintifr had urgent 
need for the goods in Hawaii and ample storage space for 
them there. Although it was known at the time of the ship-
ment to San Francisco that all goods could not be shipped on 
to Hawaii immediately upon arrival in San Francisco, there 
was no way of knowing, under the dual system of permits and 
allotment of eargo space, how long the delay would be or what 
property would be shipped through immediately. Although 
the delay was for an indefinite period, it arose entirely from 
the "lack of facilities for immediate transportation" (KeUey 
v. Rhoads, 188 U.S. 1, 5 [23 S.Ot. 259, 47 L.Ed. 859]) and 
was not longer than necessary to obtain shipping spaee. In 
Co.rsOfl, Petroleum Co. v. Vial, auFII, the United States Su-
preme Court held that oil brought into a state and held fD 
storage awaiting ships or the accumulation of enough oil to 
load a ship was immun3 from loea1 propeny taxation on the 
ground that the storage was ineidental to the transit of the 
oil through the state. Similarly. in the present ease, the stor-
age of goods brought into San Francisco was incidental to 
their shipment to Hawaii. There was not, therefore, BUfficient 
break in the continuity of interstate transit to justify the im-
})osition of the tax upon the flOOds transported by rail to San 
Franeisco en route to Hawaii. 
[5] Defendant contends that in any event the goods pur-
chased locally were subject to the tax on the ground that they 
had never been transported in interstate commerce. The mer-
chandise purchased in California at points other than San 
li'rancisco had been delivered to common carriers and had 
begun their interstate journey. (COB v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 
527 [6 S.Ct. 475, 29 L.Ed. 715].) The same rules govern this 
property as govern the property purchased outside the state, 
for the interruption in transit served the same purposes and 
arose from the same causes. (ChampliJin Realty Co. v. 
Brattleboro, 260 U.S. 866, 873 f43 S.Ct. 146, 67 L.Ed. 3091; 
Hughes Bros. Timber Co. v. MinMsotll,272 U.S. 469, 474 
[47 S.Ct. 170, 71 L.Ed. 859].) 
The only distinction between the goods purchased in San 
Francisco and the goods obtained elsewhere in California 
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is that the San Francisco goods were not delivered to common 
carriers. The regulations of the War Shipping Administra-
tion prevented delivery to the carriers that were to transport 
these goods to Hawaii, and there was no showing that the goods 
were transported from one place in San Francisco to another 
by common carriers. The issue with respect to these goods is 
whether the movement from the place of purchase to the ware-
houses where they were stored to await the allotment of cargo 
space was part of their interstate transit. The answer turns 
upon whether there is any reasonable ground for distinguish-
ing the goods purchased a few miles outside of San Francisco 
and delivered to a common carrier for shipment to Hawaii 
but diverted to San Francisco warehouses because of the short-
age of shipping space, from the goods transported within San 
Francisco to warehouses because the wartime emergency regu-
lations prohibited immediate delivery to the carriers that 
would take them to their destination. 
Defendant contends that under the rule of Coe v. Errol, 
116 U.S. 517, 527 [6 S.Ct. 475, 29 L.Ed. 715], the goods were 
subject to taxation "until they have been shipped, or entered 
with a common carrier for transportation to another state, 
or have been started upon such transportation in a continuous 
route or journey." Under this contention, if the regulations 
of the War Shipping Administration had permitted plaintiff 
to deliver the goods to a common carrier to be held under the 
carrier's control until shipping space became available, the 
goods would have been immune from taxation. but since plain-
tiff was not allowed to deliver the goods to common carriers 
that would transport them to their destination, they remained 
subject to taxation. The goods were purchased only after 
shipping permits were obtained for their transit to Hawaii 
and they were in fact shipped as soon as cargo space was allot-
ted for them by the representative of the Governor of Hawaii. 
The trial court found that "Plaintiff is not and never has 
been engaged in business or qualified to engage in business 
of any kind in the State of California." It is true that goods 
are not immune from taxation merely because the shipper 
intends to ship, and subsequently does ship, the goods in inter-
state commerce (Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1, 9 [54 S.Ot. 
34, 78 L.Ed. 131] ; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 
245, 259 [43 S.Ot. 83, 67 L.Ed. 237]), but when the shipper 
has done everything possible to deliver the goods to the com-
mon carrier for transportation to their final destination, has 
-) 
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never sold the goods locally and lacks the authority to divert 
the goods into the channels of local trade, he should not be 
penalized because wartime emergency regulations have pre-
vented him from following the normal practice of the business 
in delivering the goods directly to the common camers that 
will carry them to their ultimate destination. It was recently 
held in Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization, 
- U.S. -, - [67 S.Ct. 156, 163, 91 L.Ed. -] that 
in so far as the question of immunity from a state tax on ex-
ports under article I, section 10 of the United States Consti-
tution is concerned, delivery to a common eamer is not the 
sole test of whether the goods involved are subject to a local 
tax. "The certainty that the goods are headed to sea and 
the process of exportation has started may normally be best 
evidenced by the fact that they have been delivered to a 
common eamer for that purpose. But the same degree of 
certainty may exist though no common carrier is involved." 
In that ease delivery to a vessel furnished by the purchaser 
was held sufficient to show such certainty of exportation. The 
court recognized that rules for determining when goods are 
in the process of exportation under the Export-Import Clause 
are not always the same as the rules for determining when 
interstate transit has commenced (-- U.S. at -- [67 S.Ct. 
at 159, 91 L.Ed. -]) but the basic principle is the same, 
namely the certainty that the goods have been committed to 
a movement outside the state and will not be diverted into the 
channels of local trade. In view of the certainty in the pres-
ent ease that the goods were committed to a movement outside 
the state and would not be diverted into the channels of local 
trade, the fact that shipping permits had already been ob-
tained for the goods, and the impossibility under the wartime 
emergency regulations of delivering the goods directly to the 
common carriers that were to transport them to Hawaii, the 
movement of the goods from the place of purchase to the ware-
houses must be considered a movement in interstate commerce 
just as it would have been had the goods been delivered directly 
to the common camers and held under their control until 
shipped. 
[6] Defendant also contends that the property tax, even 
if it did not apply to the bulk of the property in transit, ap-
plies to plaintiff's intoxicating liquor stored in the San Fran-
cisco warehouses on tax day, on the ground that under the 
twenty-first amendment to the federal Constitution the state 
/ 
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may l'eg1l1ate interstate tratBc in alcoholic beverages. The 
twenty-first amendment merely prohibits the importation of 
intoxicating liquors into a state "for delivery or use therein 
. . . in violation of the laws thereof. • .." Defendant relies 
on the concurring opinions in Duc1noorlh v. ArMtI.8tJS, 314 
U.S. 390, 397 [62 S.Ot. 311, 86 L.Ed. 294, 188 A.L.R. 1144]; 
and Carier v. Virginia, 821 U.S. 131. 189 [64 S.Ot. 464, 88 
L.Ed. 605]. These opinions were concerned, not with the 
taxation of property in transit, but with the regulation of 
such transit to prevent evasion of loeallaws. Moreover, the 
majority opinion in both eases rejected the view that the 
twenty-first amendment was applicable to the transportation 
of alcoholic beverages fhrough a state. (See, also, lohnson 
v. Yellow Cab !'rGMt Co., 321 U.S. 883, 386 [64 S.Ot. 622, 
88 L.Ed. 814] ; and eases collected in 84 L.Ed. 137; 55 Yale 
L.J.815.) 
The judgment is aftlrmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J.,Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
